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Buying Power: Utility Dark Money and the Battle
over Rooftop Solar
Troy A. Rule
ABSTRACT
As rooftop solar energy systems become an ever more attractive
alternative to grid-supplied electricity, electric utilities are actively
seeking ways to protect themselves against this new form of disruptive
innovation in their markets. One strategy that some utilities are employing
involves using large “dark money” campaign contributions to influence
public utility commission races and other state-level elections. Ambiguous
campaign finance rules in the wake of the US Supreme Court’s Citizens
United decision have generated a hazardous degree of uncertainty
regarding the extent of legal constraints on investor-owned utilities’
funding of the utility regulators’ election. Accordingly, some utilities have
begun interpreting the law as permitting them to secretly make unlimited
campaign contributions and to thereby exert unbounded influence over the
regulatory structure that governs them. What legal theories or strategies
might help to resolve or mitigate this troubling new trend of dark money
politics in utility law? This essay highlights the nation’s growing
regulatory capture problems involving electric utilities and identifies some
plausible means of addressing them.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the question has been posed as to whether an electric
utility should be allowed to covertly contribute unlimited amounts of
money to the election campaigns of the five state regulators who control
that utility’s profits and who have the power to protect its monopoly. From
a public policy perspective, the answer to this question seems obvious:
restrictions on such campaign contributions are crucial to preserving the
integrity and effectiveness of utility regulatory systems. Unfortunately, as
a legal matter, the answer to this question appears open for debate. As the
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popularity of rooftop solar energy increases, legal uncertainty regarding
the extent to which utilities can indirectly fund their own regulators’
election campaigns is becoming a growing problem, particularly in
jurisdictions where these regulators are popularly elected.
Public choice theorists have long identified state Public Utility
Commissions (PUCs)1 as being susceptible to “regulatory capture,”2 a
condition arising when private parties exert undue influence over their
own regulators to the detriment of the general public.3 PUCs are
vulnerable to capture problems largely because of the tremendous impact
that PUC decisions can have on a utility’s bottom line. PUCs often
exercise significant control over utilities’ expenditures, pricing, and rates
of return on capital investments. Given what is at stake in their interactions
with PUCs, utilities are understandably tempted to try and curry
commissioners’ favor in hopes of furthering their own interests, above
those of their customers or those of the state in which they operate.
However, new market pressures and newly loosened campaign
finance laws have recently elevated regulatory capture risks at some PUCs
to a new level. In states where PUC commissioners are elected rather than
appointed, some utilities seem to believe they have a legal license to
effectively purchase seats on the very state commissions that heavily
regulate their activities. Further, there is growing evidence that this sort of
pernicious activity is already beginning to occur and is hampering the
nation’s transition toward a cleaner, more sustainable electricity system.
This essay describes how recent developments in campaign finance law
1. The acronym “PUC” used throughout this essay is also intended to
include public service commissions, corporation commissions, and any and all
other commissions that serve as a state’s primary electric utility regulators.
2. See Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 203, 203 (2006) (cited in Margot Kaminski, The Capture of
International Intellectual Property Law through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 977, 989 (2014)) (observing that “[m]ost of the literature that is
explicitly concerned with regulatory capture has been developed in the context of
utility regulation”).
3. Numerous commentators have offered definitions for regulatory capture
over the years. Most essentially describe it as a situation in which private,
regulated entities exert undue influence over their own regulators to gain benefits
at the expense of the general public. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard
L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J.
1337, 1343 (2013) (defining capture as occurring “when organized groups
successfully act to vindicate their interests through government policy at the
expense of the public interest”); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence,
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis,
6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 178 (Special Issue) (1990) (defining capture as “the
adoption by the regulator for self-regarding (private) reasons, such as enhancing
electoral support or postregulatory compensation, of a policy which would not be
ratified by an informed polity free of organization costs”).
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have created unprecedented regulatory capture risks involving electric
utilities and PUCs, and suggests possible means of addressing these
important challenges. Part I of this essay describes how the growth of
distributed solar energy is introducing new challenges for electric utilities.
Part II explains how recent developments in campaign finance law could
allow utilities to have undue influence over their own regulators in policy
struggles over rooftop solar, highlighting how one Arizona utility’s purported
dark money contributions have adversely impacted utility regulation in that
state. Part III identifies and examines some potential legal and policy
strategies for preventing utilities from exerting undue political influence in
this turbulent period of transition and change within the electricity industry.
I. BOOMING SOLAR, NERVOUS UTILITIES
Over the past decade, rooftop solar energy has emerged as a powerful and
viable form of indirect competition for electric utilities. Technological
improvements, production economies of scale,4 and other factors have
resulted in rapid price declines for photovoltaic (PV) solar panels.5
Plummeting PV module prices, combined with steady reductions in the “soft
costs” of solar energy development,6 various domestic tax credits,7 net

4. See Alan C. Goodrich, et al., Assessing the Drivers of Regional Trends in
Solar Photovoltaic Manufacturing, 6 E NERGY & ENVTL. SCI. 2811 (2013),
pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlepdf/2013/ee/c3ee40701b [https://perma.cc/6DYW
-PUA2] (concluding that China’s cost advantages in the production of solar PV cells
have been driven largely by manufacturing economies of scale and other supply-chain
related factors that could potentially be replicated in other parts of the world).
5. See GALEN BARBOSE & NAÏM DARGHOUTH, Tracking the Sun VIII: The
Installed Price of Residential and Non-Residential Photovoltaic Systems in the
United States 16 (8th ed. 2015) (finding that average PV module prices fell by
85% from 1998 to 2014).
6. See id. at 2 (reporting that the recent continued declines in the costs of
solar PV installations are “primarily associated with reductions in PV soft costs,
which include such items as marketing and customer acquisition, system design,
installation labor, permitting and inspection costs, and installer margins”).
7. In late 2015, Congress extended the federal 30% solar energy investment
tax credit through 2019, providing for a gradual decrease in the credit to 10% by
2022. See Cassandra Sweet, Wind, Solar Companies Get Boost From Tax-Credit
Extension, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, wsj.com/articles/wind-solar-companiesget-boost-from-tax-credit-extension-1450311501 [https://perma.cc/EWR8-63SJ]
(describing congressional extension of solar investment tax credit program).
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metering programs,8 and other incentives, have driven dramatic increases in
distributed solar energy installations over that period.9 In many cities
throughout the country, “distributed” solar energy installations on rooftops
and other open spaces have at last become potentially money-saving
investments for households and businesses.10
Although solar PV manufacturers and installers are delighted with
recent growth rates in their industry, electric utilities tend to take a
somewhat different view of distributed solar power. Every additional
kilowatt-hour of electricity that a customer-owned rooftop solar system
generates is one less kilowatt-hour that the system’s owner must purchase
from its utility through the grid. Accordingly, customer-owned or
privately leased rooftop solar installations are an increasingly formidable
threat to conventional utilities’ long-held monopoly position in retail
electricity markets—an ever more viable alternative means for utility
customers to meet their demands for electric power.
The emergence of rooftop solar energy creates an unprecedented
challenge for electric utilities, which are not generally accustomed to
facing market competition. State PUCs have vigorously protected most
electric utilities from competition for more than half a century by actively
preventing rival utilities from distributing retail electricity within clearly

8. See Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net:Renewable Energy and the
Environment, MidAmerican Legal Fictions, and the Supremacy Doctrine, 14
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 1-2 (2003) (explaining that “net metering,” which
“enables consumers with small generating facilities [such as] solar panels . . . to
offset their electric bills with any excess power produced at their facility, running
the retail utility meter backwards when the renewable energy generator funnels
power to the grid . . . is the cornerstone of state energy policies encouraging
private investment in renewable energy sources”).
9. Mike Munsell, US Solar Market Sets New Record, Installing 7.3GW of
Solar PV in 2015, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 22, 2106), greentechmedia.com
/articles/read/us-solar-market-sets-new-record-installing-7.3-gw-of-solar-pv-in2015 [https://perma.cc/ADH4-6XF9] (describing a finding in the GTM Research
and SEIA report U.S. Solar Market Insight 2015 Year in Review that total
cumulative solar generating capacity in the U.S. increased from roughly two
gigawatts in 2010 to twenty-five gigawatts in 2015).
10. See Cory Honeyman, U.S. Residential Solar Economic Outlook 20162020: Grid Parity, Rate Design and Net Metering Risk, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb.
22, 2016), greentechmedia.com/research/report/us-residential-solar-economicoutlook-2016-2020 [https://perma.cc/KT4L-NWXT] (reporting that residential
solar has reached grid parity in at least twenty U.S. states, a condition in which
“the levelized cost of solar-generated electricity falls below gross electricity bill
savings in the first year of a solar PV system’s life”).
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drawn exclusive service territories.11 Having historically relied upon state
utility regulators to shield them from competition, utilities today are
understandably now looking to these same regulators to help them protect
their interests and incumbent monopoly position against the rooftop solar
industry—a totally new type of competitor.12
Over the past few years, utilities have petitioned state utility regulators
for a wide range of policy and rate reforms that would slow the growth of
distributed solar energy. Utilities in some states have sought PUC approval
to dramatically raise the “fixed” portion of retail customers’ utility bills,
thereby increasing the total monthly charges paid by customers owning
solar panels.13 In other states, utilities have secured PUC approvals to
modify net metering programs in ways that make rooftop solar far less

11. State protection of electric utility monopolies has been a justifiable and
well-accepted regulatory strategy for decades. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 549–50 (1980) (stating that “utilities
are permitted to operate as monopolies because of a determination by the State that
the public interest is better served by protecting them from competition”).
12. At least one former utility commissioner has specifically predicted that
the growth of rooftop solar will drive utilities to place ever-increasing pressure
on commissioners to protect utilities’ interests. See Mark Ferron, F INAL
COMMISSIONER REPORT, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (Jan. 16,
2014), cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us
/Organization/Former_Commissioners/Peevey(1)/News_and_Announcements/9
9FinalCommissionerReport140116.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUQ5-ZTY5] (quoting
then-retiring California Public Utilities Commissioner Mark Ferron as suggesting
that the Commission would “come under intense pressure to use [its] authority to
protect the interest of the utilities over those of consumers and potential selfgenerators, all in the name of addressing exaggerated concerns about grid
stability, cost, and fairness”).
13. The Wisconsin investor-owned utility We Energies was initially granted
Public Service Commission approval in 2014 to impose these “fixed charges.”
See Thomas Content, Regulators Agree to Increase Fixed Charge on We Energies
Electric Bills, MILWAUKEE -W ISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 14, 2014,
archive.jsonline.com/business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-ratehike-plan-b99390765z1-282726581.html [https://perma.cc/WF7M-QNYT]
(describing the Wisconsin Service Commission’s approval of a 75% increase in
its fixed charges and the approval’s potential adverse impacts on rooftop solar
development within the utility’s service area). However, a county court
invalidated the charge in a case in late 2015. See Kari Lydersen, Court Rejects
Wisconsin Utility’s Fee on Solar Customers, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Oct. 30,
2015), midwestenergynews.com/2015/10/30/court-rejects-wisconsin-utilitys-feeon-solar-customers/ [https://perma.cc/JWN8-SJRA].
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cost-competitive with grid-supplied power.14 Further, at least one utility
has obtained its PUC’s permission to single out retail customers with solar
energy systems and impose additional monthly fees solely on them. 15
However, despite utilities’ increasingly vigorous resistance, the rooftop
solar industry continues to expand and become an ever more popular and
attractive option for utility customers throughout much of the country.
II. UTILITIES’ GROWING INCENTIVES AND ABILITY TO INFLUENCE PUCS
The growing popularity of rooftop solar energy is amplifying the
importance of PUCs—the primary regulators of electric utilities at the
state level. In an era when utility customers in some regions are installing
rooftop solar arrays in droves, PUCs’ decisions on issues such as solar
energy fees, demand charges, and net metering reforms are having greater
consequences on electric utilities’ bottom lines. As these decisions are
made, utilities’ incentives to impact the composition of these PUCs are
increasing as well.
A. Citizens United and its Potential Implications for Utilities
Recent developments in campaign finance law have potentially
introduced a powerful new way for investor-owned utilities to leverage
their substantial financial resources to influence who serves on state PUCs.
Chief among these developments was the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark

14. See, e.g., Daniel Rothberg, Regulators Deal a Blow to Rooftop Solar
Industry, LAS VEGAS SUN, Dec. 22, 2015, http://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/dec
/22/regulators-deal-a-blow-to-rooftop-solar-industry/ [https://perma.cc/7FTB-YJAY]
(describing the Nevada Public Utilities Commission decision approving a 75%
reduction in credits to rooftop solar energy users for excess energy generated under
net metering program in the investor-owned utility NV Energy’s service area). It is
worth noting that, as of April 2016, rooftop solar energy industry stakeholders had
filed a lawsuit seeking reversal of the Nevada Public Utilities Commission’s decision
on NV Energy’s proposed changes to net metering rules. See Krysti Shallenberger,
TASC Sues Nevada PUC to Overturn Net Metering Decision, UTILITYDIVE.COM
(Mar. 22, 2016), utilitydive.com/news/tasc-sues-nevada-puc-to-overturn-netmetering-decision/416087/ [https://perma.cc/286K-A6E2] (describing The Alliance
for Solar Choice’s newly-filed lawsuit against the Nevada Public Utilities
Commission).
15. See Ray Stern, Home Solar in Arizona Takes Hit After Vote by
Corporation Commission to Add Surcharge, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013,
phoenixnewtimes.com/news/home-solar-in-arizona-takes-hit-after-vote-bycorporation-commission-to-add-surcharge-6637814 [https://perma.cc/F67TGHWF] (describing the Arizona Corporation Commission’s approval of a
monthly fee of seventy cents per kilowatt of installed solar energy generating
capacitywithin the service area of Arizona Public Service Co.)
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holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010.16
Citizens United and other related cases effectively allow corporations to
contribute unlimited amounts of money to non-profit political entities
known as 501(c)(4) organizations, which can use those funds to indirectly
bankroll elections.17 Corporations typically are not required to publicly
disclose the amount of these so-called “dark money” contributions or that
they contributed any money at all.18
Although the Citizens United decision and its progeny have drawn
substantial criticism within the legal academy and among the general
public,19 the basic holding in the case remains intact. The 5–4 majority in
Citizens United based its holding largely on the notion that corporations
hold First Amendment free speech rights substantially equivalent to those
of individual citizens. Accordingly, corporations are equally entitled to
express their political views through undisclosed contributions to qualified
nonprofit political action groups.20
Importantly, however, neither Citizens United nor any subsequent, major
appellate case has involved a set of facts in which the making of dark money
campaign contributions was also a heavily regulated utility. Thus the question
still looms whether the five-justice majority in Citizens United intended for
the lax corporate campaign finance rules it validated to fully extend to
investor-owned electric utilities whose expenses, prices, and returns on capital
investments are largely dictated by the state. It seems doubtful that the Court
contemplated creating such a wide and problematic loophole for utilities; yet,
recent activities suggest that some utilities may already be availing themselves
of these lax corporate finance rules, helping shield their monopolies from an
escalating tide of rooftop solar energy installations.
B. A Case Study: Bright Sunshine and Dark Money in Arizona
The potentially hazardous impacts of Citizens United on state utility
regulation are perhaps most visible in Arizona, where a heated battle
between electric utilities and the rooftop solar energy industry has been
16. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
17. For general information about Citizens United and its impacts, see
generally Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 755, 761–63 (2014).
18. For an informative description of how Citizens United has given rise to dark
money contributions and an analysis of some of the impacts of these developments,
see generally Jennifer A. Heerwig & Kathryn Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The
Rhetoric and Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443 (2014).
19. See, e.g., Sitaraman, supra note 17 at 762 (noting that “[p]olling from the
weeks after the decision indicate[d] that 80% of Americans opposed the Court's
ruling”).
20. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339–40.
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brewing for years. Arizona has characteristics that make it particularly
vulnerable to utility regulatory capture in this era of affordable rooftop
solar energy and permissive dark money laws. For example, the state has
excellent solar energy resources,21 which have helped to drive a blistering
pace of rooftop solar energy development and to catapult the state to near
the top of a wide range of solar energy ranking lists.22 However, Arizona
is also one of about a dozen states that elect, rather than appoint, its utility
regulators.23 All five seats on the Arizona state agency regulating electric
utilities—the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC)—are filled
through popular elections.24 In states such as Arizona, where
commissioners are elected rather than appointed, utilities can more easily
use indirect “dark money” campaign contributions to impact the outcome
of commissioner elections.
Historically, elections for seats on the ACC have been relatively quiet
and uneventful affairs involving only modest levels of campaign
expenditures. However, that changed in 2014, when two of the five
commission seats came up for election. The 2014 ACC election cycle
seemed especially important to Arizona’s largest utility, Arizona Public
Service Co. (APS)—an investor-owned utility with more than one million
in-state customers.25 The pace of rooftop solar installations had been
rapidly increasing in Arizona. In response to this growth, APS had recently
become the first major utility in the country to earn regulators’ approval
21. A National Renewable Energy Laboratory study found that Arizona’s
potential for electricity generation through rooftop PV is 22,736 GWh per year,
placing the state in the top ten in the U.S. See Anthony Lopez, et al., U.S.
Renewable Energy Technical Potentials: A GIS-Based Analysis 12, N AT’L
R ENEWABLE E NERGY L AB . (July 2012), nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/51946.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JNS-74YL].
22. See, e.g., Top Ten Solar States, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N (March
2016), seia.org/research-resources/top-10-solar-states [https://perma.cc/93H9BT24] (reporting that Arizona ranks second in the country for total installed solar
energy generating capacity and fourth for solar energy generating capacity per
capita).
23. Most states empower the governor to appoint utility commissioners. In those
states, utilities’ only potential means of influencing appointments is to contribute
heavily to a gubernatorial campaign or to directly lobby to the offices of sitting
governors. Utility commission seats are filled via gubernatorial appointment in 38 of
the 50 states. In Virginia, a state legislative vote determines who serves on the state’s
utility commission. See PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ELECTIONS, 2016: ELECTED
VS. APPO INTED COMM IS SIONERS , B ALLOTPE D IA, ba llo tp ed ia.o r g
/Public_Service_Commission_elections,_2016#Elected_vs._appointed_commission
ers [https://perma.cc/JN4W-SQJK].
24. See id. Laws in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota
provide for the popular election of utility commissioners.
25. See APS, Company Profile, aps.co m/en/ourco mpany/aboutus
/companyprofile/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/JZ7L-UHU5].
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to single out customers with solar panels and charge them an extra monthly
fee.26 But the new fee was small and based on the nature of the negotiations
that led to the fee, it was evident that APS wanted it to be much higher.27
It was clear to all stakeholders that the composition of the ACC over the
coming years would have a tremendous impact on how soon the utility
could obtain approval to increase its new solar fees.
With so much at stake in the 2014 ACC elections, APS, or its parent
company, Pinnacle West, appear to have availed itself of the loose “dark
money” campaign finance rules resulting under Citizens United to have a
material impact on the election outcome. Specifically, it is widely suggested
in the media—and neither APS nor Pinnacle West has denied—that the
utility or its affiliates funneled millions of dollars into third-party groups that
waged an aggressive campaign to promote the election of two particular
candidates to the ACC.28 Tom Forese and Doug Little, a pair of candidates
who ran for the ACC together and benefited from substantial dark money
support that APS or Pinnacle West will not deny contributing,29 ultimately
prevailed in what was a relatively close election.30
The practical consequences of APS’s apparent purchase of seats on
the ACC began to emerge less than five months after the 2014 election. In
April of 2015, APS submitted a proposal to the ACC to more than

26. See Matthew Philips, Arizona’s New Fee Puts a Dent in Rooftop Solar
Economics, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2013, bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2013-11-22/arizonas-new-fee-puts-a-dent-in-rooftop-solar-economics
[https://perma.cc/2F2J-SZHK] (describing APS’s newly-approved monthly fees on
distributed solar energy users as the “first ever in the U.S.”).
27. See id. (noting that “APS had hoped to be able to charge about $50 a
month per home” rather than the mere $3 to $6 that received ACC approval).
28. See Ryan Randazzo, Regulator Robert Burns Wants APS to Disclose
‘Dark Money’ Donations, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 2015, azcentral
.com/story/money/business/energy/2015/12/01/regulator-robert-burns-wantsaps-disclose-its-dark-money-contributions-political-candidates/76592810/
[https://perma.cc/NR4W-642Y] (stating that “APS, the state’s biggest utility, is
widely believed to have contributed about $3.2 million last year to independent
political groups that campaigned for . . . Tom Forese and Doug Little”).
29. See Letter from Don Brandt, APS CEO, to Bob Burns, ACC Commissioner
(Dec. 29, 2015), images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000168038.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GC74-GZHU] (refusing a request to disclose the extent of APS’s or Pinnacle
West’s political contributions on the ground that “[c]ompelled disclosure about
political contributions that APS or its affiliates may have made out of shareholders
profits would go beyond what is required of all corporations under Arizona campaign
finance law, and would impinge on APS’s First Amendment rights”).
30. See Ryan Randazzo, Republicans Forese, Little Win Arizona Corporation
Commission Race, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 2014, azcentral.com/story
/money/business/2014/11/04/arizona -corporation-commission-electionnight/18427899/ [https://perma.cc/Y6B4-EMVY].
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quadruple the size of the utility’s new fees on rooftop solar energy users.31
In a surprisingly bold decision, a 3–2 majority on the newly-composed
commission—including Forese and Little—voted a few months later to
allow the ACC to address this fee increase request outside the context of a
formal rate case.32
To many outside observers, it seemed that by early 2015, APS had
lawfully succeeded in capturing the government body charged with regulating
its activities.33 The term “regulatory capture,” which appears frequently
within the public choice and legal academic literature, describes such
instances when a regulated private party exerts heavy influence over its
regulators and thereby advances its own interests above the broader policy
objectives that the regulators were entrusted to protect.34 In Arizona, APS had
ostensibly captured the ACC by materially influencing the election of at least
two of the commission’s five members. Moreover, APS seemingly sought to
leverage this capture situation to secure regulatory outcomes that benefited
the utility but arguably not the broader interests of Arizona citizens.
III. PRESERVING PUCS’ INTEGRITY IN THE DARK MONEY ERA
As distributed solar energy becomes a more viable alternative to gridsupplied power, utility dark money controversies like that in Arizona are

31. See Press Release, APS,APS Asks to Reset Grid Access Charge for Future
Solar Customers (Apr. 2, 2015), aps.com/en/ourcompany/news/latestnews/Pages/aps
-asks-to-reset-grid-access-charge-for-future-colar-customers.aspx [https://perma
.cc/FNZ6-MPX2] (reporting that APS had formally sought ACC approval to increase
the grid access charge established by the Commission in November 2013 from
seventy cents per kilowatt–or approximately $5 per month–to $3 per kilowatt, or
roughly $21 per month for future residential solar customers).
32. See Ryan Randazzo, Regulators Delay APS Solar-Fee Decision, THE
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Aug. 18, 2015, (describing the 3–2 ACC decision in which
Commissioners Bob Stump, Doug Little, and Tom Forese voted in favor of
commencing a proceeding prior to and outside of APS’s scheduled 2016 rate case
to address APS’s request for increased monthly fees on solar energy users).
33. See, e.g., Ray Stern, APS’ Alleged “Dark Money” Toward Two Candidates
Looks to Have Paid Off, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Aug. 26, 2014, phoenixnewtimes
.com/news/aps-alleged-dark-money-toward-two-candidates-looks-to-have-paid-off6634263 [https://perma.cc/7W8H-J2QA] (quoting failed ACC election candidate
Vernon Parker as stating, “This is not good, when a regulated monopoly can choose
who regulates them[.]”).
34. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV.
1, 2 (2010) (defining regulatory capture as a “phenomenon whereby regulated
entities wield their superior organizational capacities to secure favorable agency
outcomes at the expense of the diffuse public” and as a “regulatory manifestation
[of] public choice theory”).
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likely to grow more common.35 Particularly in states where public utility
commissioners are elected rather than appointed, utilities’ perceived license
to use dark money contributions to impact who regulates them is deeply
troubling. In the wake of Citizens United, appropriately limiting utilities’
influence on PUC elections in these states is more important than ever before.
A. The Recusal Approach
One strategy for combating utility regulatory capture issues, akin to the
apparent situation in Arizona, is to demand that sitting PUC commissioners
known to have received heavy financial support from a particular entity
during their election bids recuse themselves from PUC matters that involve
that entity or its affiliates. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in the
2009 case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. arguably requires such
recusal when an entity’s support of a PUC commission candidate was so
substantial that it likely impacted the outcome of the election.36
Caperton involved a large coal company that had recently been ordered
in state court to pay a $50 million judgment for fraudulently canceling a coal
mining agreement.37 Rather than simply paying the judgment, the company,
Massey Coal, appealed the decision to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals—a court whose justices are popularly elected. While waiting for the
higher court to hear the case, Massey Coal’s Chief Executive Officer, Don
Blankenship, then contributed $3 million through a non-profit corporation to
the election campaign of a particular candidate—Brent Benjamin—to fill a
vacancy on that same court.38 Blankenship’s $3 million contribution exceeded
all other funds raised or spent by Benjamin or his campaign committee and
ultimately helped Benjamin to win the election and take a seat on the court.39
When Massey Coal’s appeal eventually came before the court, Caperton
requested that Justice Benjamin recuse himself from hearing it. Caperton
justified his request by arguing that Blankenship’s sizable contributions to
Justice Benjamin’s campaign created too great a risk of bias in favor of
Massey Coal.
35. See, e.g., Eric Barton, Big Energy’s Campaign Cash Keeps Solar Down in
Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 2015, miamiherald.com/news/politics-government
/article17474102.html [https://perma.cc/PTH7-PBT5] (describing how “Florida’s
largest utilities have invested heavily in state political campaigns to fend off
competition”). For more examples of utilities’ recent efforts to combat the growth of
rooftop solar energy through political and lobbying activities, see generally Bret
Fanshaw & Gideon Weissman, Blocking the Sun:12 Utilities and Fossil Fuel Interests
that are Undermining American Solar Power, FRONTIER GROUP (Oct. 2015).
36. See generally 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
37. Id. at 872.
38. Id. at 873.
39. Id.
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In a 5–4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Justice Benjamin was
indeed legally obligated to recuse himself from hearing the Caperton case.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated:
[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and
reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.40
The majority opinion in Caperton also explains how decisions
regarding whether recusal is required in these situations should be made.
According to the court, such inquiries must center on the “contribution’s
relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect
such contribution had on the outcome of the election.”41 In Blankenship’s
case, his “significant and disproportionate influence” on the outcome of
Justice Benjamin’s election,” “coupled with the temporal relationship
between the election and the pending case,” caused the “probability of
actual bias” to rise to “an unconstitutional level.”42
1. Recent Calls for Commissioner Recusals in Arizona
The facts in Caperton bear a striking resemblance to those alleged in
connection with Arizona’s 2014 ACC elections. The $3.2 million that APS
or Pinnacle West purportedly contributed to 501(c)(4) groups supporting
the joint campaigns of Tom Forese and Doug Little easily exceeded all
other expenditures by all candidates in the 2014 ACC elections and quite
possibly had a material effect on the election outcome. 43 Further, the
ACC’s website states that commissioners act in a judicial capacity when
hearing rate cases, suggesting that Forese and Little were acting in a
capacity that was legally equivalent or at least similar to that of Justice
Blankenship in Caperton. Moreover, the fact that APS submitted a request
to more than quadruple its monthly fees on retail customers with rooftop
solar energy systems just a few months after Forese and Little took their
40. Id. at 884.
41. Id.
42. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886–87 (2009).
43. See Mary Jo Pitzl & Rob O’Dell, Outside Money Played Huge Role in
Arizona Elections, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 8, 2014, azcentral.com/story
/news/arizona/politics/2014/11/09/election-outside-money-campaign-funding
/18751133/ [https://perma.cc/48ZY-K8GA] (reporting that a total of $4,901,982 was
spent on campaigns in the 2014 ACC elections and that $3,837,582 of those
expenditures were by “independent expenditure committees”).
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new seats on the ACC shows a temporal relationship not unlike that in
Caperton.44
Given the strong similarities between the facts in Caperton and those
surrounding the APS dark money controversy in Arizona, it is hardly
surprising that there have already been calls for Commissioners Forese and
Little to recuse themselves from APS-related matters before the PUC. In
particular, two former ACC commissioners filed a formal request in
September of 2015 for Commissioners Forese and Little to recuse
themselves from the ACC’s consideration of APS’s request to quadruple
its fees on rooftop solar users.45 Tellingly, less than one week after the
former commissioners filed their request, APS voluntarily withdrew its
fee-quadrupling proposal.46 This quick APS response suggests that the
mere threat of recusals based on Caperton are already helping to temper
regulatory capture issues at the ACC, and could eventually serve a similar
function in other jurisdictions.
2. The Limits of Recusal-Based Strategies for Policing Utility
Regulatory Capture
Although the threat of recusal demands is one plausible means of
policing against utilities’ use of dark money contributions to influence
PUC elections, it also suffers from some serious limitations. Perhaps chief
among these limitations is the fact that the most important evidence needed
to succeed in such recusal demands is arguably shielded from disclosure.
To win a court order based on Caperton requiring a commissioner’s
recusal from a particular entity’s PUC matter, the person seeking the order
must provide evidence that the entity made sizable contributions favoring
that commissioner’s candidacy. Yet, obtaining evidence of these
contributions is difficult in an era where most corporations can legally

44. See supra note 31.
45. See Eric Jay Toll, Complaint Seeks Recusal of 3 Arizona Corporation
Commission Members in Upcoming APS Case, PHOENIX BUSINESS JOURNAL,
Sept. 22, 2015, bizjournals.com/phoenix/morning_call/2015/09/complaint-seeksrecusal-of-3-corporation.html [https://perma.cc/P43T-GD6A] (describing filings
by former ACC Commissioners Bill Mundell and Renz Jennings, citing Caperton
and alleged APS dark money contributions, and demanding that Commissioners
Forese and Little recuse themselves from considering APS-related matters).
46. See Bob Christie, Arizona Pulls Rate Hike Request for New Solar Customers,
THE WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2015, washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/25/arizonapulls-rate-hike-request-for-new-solar-cust/ [https://perma.cc/8VNC-WN3Q]
(describing decision by APS to withdraw its ACC request for increases to its monthly
solar fees).
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make large donations through dark money channels without disclosing
their identities.47
The problem of utilities hiding campaign contributions based on
purported nondisclosure rights has been on full display in the controversy
surrounding APS and its alleged dark money contributions benefiting
Commissioners Forese and Little. In late 2015, ACC Commissioner Bob
Burns sent a formal letter to APS and Pinnacle West demanding that the
entities disclose all such contributions made during the 2014 election cycle
and asserting that the Arizona Constitution empowered him to demand
disclosure.48 In response, APS CEO Don Brandt sent a letter brazenly refusing
to disclose any APS or Pinnacle West contributions. Brandt sought to boldly
justify this refusal based on the fact that APS and Pinnacle West were
corporations, declaring, “[c]ompelled disclosure about political contributions
that APS or its affiliates may have made out of shareholder profits would go
beyond what is required of all corporations under Arizona campaign-finance
law, and would impinge on APS’ First Amendment rights.”49
As of early 2016, APS and Pinnacle West continued to resist
Commissioner Burns’ demands that the entities disclose any and all dark
money contributions related to the 2014 ACC elections. Frustrated by the
companies’ behavior, Commissioner Burns began refusing to vote on any
APS-related matters, stating that he would not resume doing so until the
utility complied with his disclosure demands.50 As this unusual battle over
47. See Brent Ferguson, Beyond Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign
Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 471 (2015)
(observing that direct “[c]ontributions to candidates are fully disclosed, but
current law provides various ways for outside groups to obscure the true source
of their funding”).
48. A former Arizona Supreme Court Justice produced a seven-page letter in
September of 2015 supporting the notion that an ACC Commissioner could subpoena
records about such contributions. See Laurie Roberts, Retired Chief Justice:
Regulators Can Force APS to Disclose Dark Money, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept.
17, 2015, (discussing former Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Zlaket’s
letter determining that ACC commissioners were “clearly empowered” under Arizona
law to subpoena records from APS and Pinnacle West).
49. Ryan Randazzo, APS Refuses Request to Disclose Political Contributions,
THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 2015, azcentral.com/story/money/business/energy
/2015/12/30/aps-refuses-request-disclose-political-contributions/78104254/ [https:
//perma.cc/C6UN-5URU].
50. See Ryan Randazzo, Corporation Commissioner Robert Burns Refuses to
Vote for APS Items Until Company Discloses ‘Dark Money’ Ties, THE ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 2016, azcentral.com/story/money/business/energy/2016/04/12
/corporation-commissioner-robert-burns-refuses-vote-aps-items-until-companydiscloses-dark-money-ties/82954430/ [https://perma.cc/VBF8-55WH] (reporting that
ACC Commissioner Bob Burns had declared that “he will not advance any of the
utility’s business matters until it complies with his request to review any spending it
has done on elections”).
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disclosure shows, demanding commissioner recusals based on Caperton
can only truly be an effective means of combating the sort of dark moneydriven capture problems seemingly evident in Arizona if a court,
commissioner, or other party is able to compel disclosure of the
contributions at issue.
A second disadvantage of relying on Caperton-based calls for recusal
to limit regulatory capture at PUCs is that it is a purely ex post solution to
the problem. Because one can make such recusal demands only after a
commissioner has already won election and is sitting on a PUC, this
recusal approach can weaken a PUC’s capacity to effectively regulate.
Some state PUCs have as few as three members, so the absence of even
one commissioner can substantially hinder a PUC’s ability to govern on a
particular utility’s matters for years at a time.
One other drawback of relying on Caperton to limit utilities’ capture
of PUCs is that it is likely only a viable strategy in the minority of states
that elect, rather than appoint, PUC members. In most states the governor
is empowered to appoint PUC commissioners.51 If a utility in a state that
appoints PUC commissioners made large indirect dark money
contributions supporting a particular gubernatorial campaign in hopes of
influencing a new governor’s PUC appointments, it is unclear whether the
rule in Caperton would apply.
Likewise, since Caperton involved an elected judge acting in a judicial
capacity, its holding would likely not apply to situations in which utilities
made sizable contributions through 501(c)(4) entities to support the
election campaigns of state legislators. There is growing evidence that, in
a few states, powerful investor-owned utilities are lobbying heavily within
legislatures for new statutory rules that slow the adoption of distributed
solar energy.52 Since legislators do not act in a judicial capacity, the
holding in Caperton would likewise not support requiring legislators who
had received large campaign contributions from utilities to recuse
themselves from legislative votes on utility-related legislation.53
51. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
52. A bill enacted in Utah in Spring 2016 exemplify this trend. See Emma
Penrod, 13 Utah Lawmakers Change Votes, Pass Rocky Mountain Power Plan,
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 10, 2016, sltrib.com/home/3647139-155/utahhouse-reconsiders-and-passes-rocky [https://perma.cc/HB6Q-45SH] (describing
how Rocky Mountain Power, a large investor-owned utility that “holds financial
sway within Utah politics” “mounted a sizable lobbying effort” in the Utah
legislative session’s “final hours” to secure passage of a bill that opponents say
would have “potential to kill hundreds of solar jobs in the state”).
53. It is worth noting that Professor John Nagle, who also participated in this
symposium, penned an article advocating for laws requiring such legislator
recusals more than a decade ago. See generally John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal
Alternative to Campaign Finance Reform, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 69 (2000).
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B. A Broader Approach: Distinguishing Utilities from Other
Corporations under Citizens United
Given the shortcomings of recusal-based approaches to limiting utility
regulatory capture, is there any other means of addressing these risks? A
more comprehensive way of addressing them would be through a major
appellate court decision that distinguished heavily regulated utilities from
ordinary corporations under Citizens United and established that utilities
had comparatively narrower rights to contribute to political campaigns.
Suppose, for example, that a state enacted legislation prohibiting
regulated utilities and their affiliates from directly or indirectly contributing
more than $2,500 per election cycle to campaigns for public utility
commission seats and required full disclosure of any such contributions. If an
investor-owned electric utility challenged such a law, it is uncertain as to how
the U.S. Supreme Court would rule on the issue. Given the significant
unpopularity and backlash associated with the Citizens United holding, the
Court may be willing to carve out investor-owned utilities from the case’s
permissible campaign finance rules.
At first glance, it seems that any such restrictions on corporate
contributions to campaigns would be unconstitutional under Citizens
United. After all, investor-owned utilities like APS are typically private
corporate entities and are not all that different from Microsoft, Amazon,
or any other corporation. Moreover, the Citizens United line of cases
essentially establishes that corporations have First Amendment rights to
secretly make limitless contributions to 501(c)(4) organizations that
support particular candidates.54
However, investor-owned utilities arguably have distinctive attributes
that make them materially different from ordinary corporations and thus
deserving of a less permissive set of campaign finance rules. Unlike
Microsoft or Amazon, many investor-owned electric utilities enjoy state
protected monopolies and, in exchange, have impliedly consented to
having their expenditures, pricing, and rate of return effectively dictated
by a government agency.55 Surely, this special type of corporation, which
is effectively an arm of the state and has always been uniquely prone to

54. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
55. See Troy A. Rule, Unnatural Monopolies: Why Utilities Don’t Belong in
Rooftop Solar Markets, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 401, 403 (2016) (stating that utility
regulations “generally prohibit utilities from charging excessive prices and ensure
that utilities provide service to all qualified customers within their service areas”
and that, “[i]n exchange for these obligations, state regulators protect utilities from
certain types of competition and allow them to earn a reasonable return on their
infrastructure investments.”).
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regulatory capture problems, is deserving of separate treatment under
campaign finance laws.
Language from Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurring opinion in Citizens
United supports the notion that the majority in that case did not contemplate
having its loose campaign finance principles apply to heavily regulated
utilities, even when those utilities are investor-owned corporations. A known
originalist, Justice Scalia reasoned in his concurring opinion that the Founders
did not originally extend broad campaign finance privileges to corporations
because corporations during that era were fundamentally different from those
operating today. Justice Scalia reasoned that “[m]ost of the Founders’
resentment towards corporations was directed at the state-granted monopoly
privileges that individually chartered corporations enjoyed. Modern
corporations do not have such privileges, and would probably have been
favored [for broad speech rights] by most of our enterprising Founders.”56
Scalia’s observations certainly ring true as to most modern corporations;
however, they definitely do not apply to electric utilities, which do have
“state-granted monopoly privileges.” In fact, Justice Scalia’s originalist
rationale for distinguishing modern free-market corporations from early statechartered ones arguably supports applying separate, more stringent campaign
finance rules to investor-owned utilities, instead of conflating them with the
Amazons and Microsofts of the world.
Language appearing later in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Citizens United further bolsters the argument that the majority in that case
did not intend for regulated utilities to enjoy the same loose treatment
under campaign finance laws as ordinary corporations. Scalia
emphatically stated, “ . . . to exclude or impede corporate speech is to
muzzle the principal agents of the modern free economy.”57 This statement
reveals again Scalia’s presumption in Citizens United that the “corporate
speech” at issue was speech by a prototypical corporation—one that is
generally free to make its own reasonable decisions about expenditures,
pricing, and where it does business. Those sorts of entities are agents of
the “modern free economy” and tend to operate in at least somewhat
competitive markets.
In contrast, regulated electric utilities, which operate solely within
exclusive, government-dictated territories and pursuant to heavy legal
constraints on their expenditures, pricing and other activities, are not
“agents of the modern free economy” at all. Excluding or impeding their
speech through reasonable campaign finance rules thus arguably has no
troublesome “muzzling” effect akin to what Justice Scalia described.
Instead, it prevents utilities from leveraging their government-provided
56. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 388 (2010).
57. Id. at 929.
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advantages and incumbent monopoly status to drown out the voices of
other less-privileged stakeholders, to capture their own regulators, and to
stifle innovation.
A relevant case before the U.S. Supreme Court would be the most
straightforward way to establish that utilities are materially distinguishable
from ordinary corporations under Citizens United and subject to more
stringent campaign finance rules. For instance, a case challenging a state
statute that, like the hypothetical statute described above, restricted
regulated utilities’ campaign contributions and required them to publicly
disclose all such activities might compel a court to address the issue.
Unfortunately, utilities’ heavy influence within many state legislatures
might also create obstacles to the passage of such a bill.58
In states with constitutions allowing for referenda or ballot initiatives,
those modes might provide a potential alternative means of resolving the
existing legal uncertainty regarding utilities and campaign finance
activities. A successful ballot initiative restricting utility political
contributions could easily draw constitutional challenges from utilities and
provide an opportunity for courts to rule on the issue. By effectively
circumventing state legislatures, such initiatives could potentially even be
an option in states in which a major electric utility has substantial influence
within the state government.
CONCLUSION
Although the future remains bright for rooftop solar energy, clouds of
utility dark money politics increasingly loom on the horizon. Fortunately,
there exist plausible strategies for preventing utilities from exerting undue
influence over their own regulators and thereby slowing the growth of
distributed solar. In states where PUC commissioners are popularly
elected, the possibility of demanding commissioner recusal based on
Caperton provides one potent means of deterring campaign finance
through utility dark money. However, in states where governors appoint
the commissioners, calls for commissioner recusal are less likely to
succeed. In those states, a state statute or ballot initiative with provisions
that limit utility campaign contributions and require their disclosure on the
ground that investor-owned utilities are materially distinguishable from
ordinary corporations under Citizens United is the most promising means
of combatting utility regulatory capture problems.
Hopefully, courts and policymakers will soon recognize the distinct
characteristics of regulated utilities in the context of campaign finance and
58. See, e.g., supra note 52 (describing Rocky Mountain Power’s “financial
sway in Utah politics”).
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embrace more restrictive rules to guard against utility regulatory capture.
Policies that clearly address these issues and thereby mitigate capture
problems will grow ever more important as the nation continues its
exciting transition toward a more sustainable and resilient energy system.

